support atheism. However, in this paper I shall argue that "atheism" for Cudworth means the rejection of "theism," i.e. the denial of the transcendent, personal and benevolent deity of the Christian PlatonicAristotelian tradition. I do not wish to deny the social and historical complexities associated with the use of the term "atheism" in the seventeenth century. Notwithstanding these considerations, Cudworth is a humanist and his consideration of the role of the antique sources of atheism, especially Lucretius's De Rerum Natura, helps to explain why the men of latitude of the seventeenth century were properly designated the "Cambridge Platonists" in the nineteenth century. Cudworth uses atheism both in the sense of SA and PA, but he is quite aware of the distinction between the two-as I hope to demonstrate. A powerful and persuasive example of the view that atheism has quite a different meaning from contemporary usage is to be found in Frederick Beiser's excellent monograph The Sovereignty of Reason. Beiser presents an account of the importance of reason as part of a liberal Protestant reaction to the Calvinism of Protestant Orthodoxy at Cambridge. Reason is "the voice of conscience, the guide to salvation, the badge of Christian liberty and the sign of grace." 2 Here is a carefully argued and stimulating account of the thought of the Cambridge Platonists. However, I think he is playing down the genuine significance of atheism in our sense of speculative atheism, SA. This phenomenon explains much of the real and genuinely philosophical interest in Plato evinced by the Cambridge Platonists. I think it is mistake to see atheism as merely representing that which we have designated pragmatic atheism or PA.
Beiser marshals a number of arguments for his position. Firstly he raises the important point of chronology. Hobbes publishes On Humane Nature and De Corpore Politico in 1640 and in 1642 De Cive. Yet the essential position of the Cambridge Platonists had been formulated by 1642, hence it is most unlikely that Hobbes could have been the original bête noir. This seems to me most convincing. The dominant issue in Cambridge amongst the Divines was predestination, and it was not until the 1650s that Hobbes and Descartes are discussed. With the Restoration of the Monarchy the philosophy of Hobbes achieved a novel pertinence in the 1660s. Thus in terms of chronology there is much to recommend Beiser's initial point.
